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FOREWORD 
The principal aim of health care research at IIASA has 
been to develop a family of submodels of national health care 
systems for use by health service planners. The modeling work 
is proceeding along the lines proposed in the Institute's 
current Research Plan, It involves the construction of linked 
submodels dealing with population, disease prevalence, resource 
need, resource allocation, and resource supply. 
This paper analyzes the work completed in the Health Care 
Systems (HCS) Task and in particular looks at the application of 
the Disaggregated Resource Allocation Model in an economy where 
HCS resource allocation is determined by patient demand and is 
not necessarily in equilibr~um with supply. 
Related publications in the Health Care Task are listed 
at the end of this report, 
Andrei Rogers 
Chairman 
Human Settlements 
and Services Area 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the consequences of adding a 
demand constraint to models of the response of the health 
care system (HCS) to alternative levels of resources. Dis- 
equilibrium econometric techniques are shown to be applicable, 
and the model is extended to include the possibility of demand 
creation by physicians and referral by generalists to special- 
ists. It is also shown that incentives affect the response of 
use of the HCS to resources, 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to describe some possible 
additions to and modifications of the health systems models 
at IIASA (described in Shigan et al.,1979a) in order to broaden 
the applicability of those models. In particular, the paper 
will suggest additional ways of estimating or forecasting re- 
source use and allocation which are especially applicable to 
countries with decentralized or market oriented health care 
systems (HCSts). These suggestions indicate how medical care 
forecasting models such as IIASAts Disaggregated Resource 
Allocation Model (DRAM) (Hughes aod ~ierzbicki, 1980) could 
be modified and extended to systems in which markets are used 
to allocate some medical resources. They also indicate how 
demand-based models (e.g., Newhouse, 1974) could be adapted to 
centrally planned, supply-constrained medical care systems. 
The model to be discussed is of a Disaggregated Incentive 
and Demand Disequilibrium (DIDD) type. It will have the fol- 
lowing features that distinguish it from DRAM. 
(i) D I D D  permits use and resource allocation to be determined 
by patient demand as well as by provider preferences. It 
does not assume that demand (at a given quality level) is 
insatiable, or that excess demand always prevails. 
(ii) D I D D  proposes an econometric approach to deal with the 
problem of forecasting when some observations may repre- 
sent disequilibrium (either excess demand or excess supply), 
while others represent equilibrium. 
(iii) D I D D  permits the possibility that observed output and use 
may depend on incentives to providers, both in the sense 
of incentives to modify patient demands and in the sense 
of incentives for increasing productivity given demand. 
(iv) D I D D  assumes that decisions made by individual enterprises 
in the system do not necessarily correspond to those 
desired by a central authority or by any single agent. 
Rather, the system should be modeled as the interaction 
of numerous disaggregated individual agents (all assumed 
to be maximizing utility subject to some constraints), 
whose objectives, incentives, and constraints may differ. 
These suggestions are consistent with the criticism of 
DRAM by Rutten (in Shigan et al., 1979b, p. 141) : 
Only in subsectors of the system which are in large 
part supply determined (in therestricted sense that 
consumption depends on resources ) will this model 
perform well. But major changes in organization, 
financing, etc., might affect the model predictions, 
even in these subsectors, since the model does not 
take these factors into account. Given the elegant 
mathematical framework of DRAM and the possibility 
to disaggregate, it should be investigated if the 
above-stated disadvantages of this model could be 
overcome. 
In this paper, I will first provide a fairly detailed 
critique of DRAM in order to motivate the modifications and 
additions which follow. Then I will present an intuitive 
explanation of the importance of demand and disequilibrium. 
Next, I will discuss several more detailed econometric models 
which try to come to grips with the issue of adding demand and 
incentives for disaggregated agents. I will also deal with 
the issues of incentives for production efficiency and incen- 
tives to "create" demand. I will close with some observations 
on empirical applications of the model. 
2. THE DRAM MODEL OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES: AN ECONOMIC 
CRITIQUE 
2.1. Introduction 
DRAM represents an attempt to forecast the use of outputs 
of the medical care system (such as hospital admissions, days 
of stay,.and doctor consultations). These outputs are assumed 
to be generated by a process that operates as if a single 
decisionmaker maximized a utility function subject to a re- 
source or budget constraint (or with resource use nega- 
tively affecting unconstrained utility). This decisionmaker's 
utility is thought to depend on the closeness of actual outputs 
to ideal standards and (sometimes) on money costs, and is maxi- 
mized subject to a constraint on physical resources used to 
produce those outputs and (sometimes) on money costs (Gibbs, 
1978a, Gibbs, 1978b, Hughes and Wierzbicki, 1980). The model 
is basically one of rationing, but with choices made as if by 
a single decisionmaker. When resources are insufficient to 
achieve either ideal levels (as far as the decisionmaker is 
concerned) or actual quantities demanded(as far as patients 
or perhaps physicians are concerned), what kind of outputs 
in what amounts does the decisionmaker decide to give to 
what kinds of people? 
In a formal sense, the idea of utility maximization sub- 
ject to a budget constraint is the paradigm of almost all neo- 
classical economic theory. But one question is rather whether 
such an "as if" model, and one with this particular set of 
characteristics, is likely to be the best way of modeling a 
system. 
An example may help to explain the economist's apprehension. 
One could describe competitive equilibrium as the result of a 
single decisionmaker's utility maximization subject to the 
economy-wide resource constraint. But this characterization 
would not be as useful as the model of competitive equilibrium 
because 
(a) it fails to model the behavioral response of the 
multiple agents who are actually in the system to 
the decentralized incentives they face, and, more 
importantly, 
(b) it is not likely to be able to track or predict 
very well if the determinants of supply and demand 
vary over time or across areas or if resources are 
redistributed. 
While one might continually recalibrate the model or add things 
to the "utility function", such a model could soon become either 
hopelessly unwieldy or hopelessly inaccurate. 
Somewhat the same comment would apply to the health care 
system, at least in decentralized countries. There is no single 
decisionmaker; there is demand and supply. Of course, this 
market is not perfectly competitive, and one of the great con- 
troversies in health economics has been concerned with the 
question of how to model a system if it is neither perfectly 
competitive nor perfectly monopolistic. 
With this word of caution in mind, let us now turn to a 
more specific consideration of the assumptions underlying DRAM. 
2.2. Demand 
Surely the most questionable feature of DRAM is the postu- 
late that demand is always and everywhere unsatisfied (and there- 
fore irrelevant); that use is wholly determined by HCS preferences 
and standards. 
Furthermore, it appears that in - none of the places 
studied (U.S. and U.K. ) has the supply of beds 
reached the level at which in-patient care is given 
to all individuals who seek it, at the ideal average 
length of stay. (Gibbs, 1978a, p.5.) 
This observation is repeated in the most recent statement: 
It has been widely observed that the demand for 
health care seems to be insatiable. (Hughes and Wierzbicki, 
1980,p.l,) 
While such an observation may correctly characterize the situation 
in the U.K., in which user price is zero and supply has been 
constrained for decades, one need not undertake sophisticated 
statistical studies to adiscover that it is not universally true. 
With nonzero (though low) hospital user prices and unconstrained 
supply, the United States finds itself with low average occuDancy 
rates (less than 80 percent for the country as a whole and rates 
as low as 63 percent for voluntary hospitals with fewer than 
100 beds). Surprisingly, some of the lowest occupancy rates 
occur in the West, where there is also a relatively low number 
of hospital beds per capita. In a similar way, Canada with 
a zero money user price but with a supply of beds which, for 
historical reasons, is fairly generous, also finds itself with 
significant numbers of empty beds. (Note also that, while low 
occupancy rates are clearly inconsistent with the assumption of 
unsatisfied demand, even high rates are possibly consistent with 
satiation if supply has been set just equal to demand.) As a 
general proposition then it is simply false to assert that 
"nowhere have the demands for beds been saturated ..." (Rousseau 
and Gibbs, 1980) and a model built on such an assumption is 
not going to be universally applicable. 
If the proposition is untrue in general for hospital beds, 
it appears to be even less true for physicians' services. A 
great concern in the United States is the purported surplus of 
physicians in certain specialties, especially surgery and medi- 
cal specialties. Indeed, the "demand creationn literature 
(discussed further below) depends critically on the assumption 
that physicians are willing and indeed eager to supply more 
of their own services at current gross fee levels than con- 
sumers would demand if they were given accurate advice. Lest 
one think that such phenomena only characterize private sector 
supply, it should be noted that the number of visits per physi- 
cian for publicly salaried physicians sent to supposed scarcity 
areas, under the National Health Service Corps programs, is ex- 
ceedingly low: less than half of the average output levels of 
a private-practice general practitioner (8). This either means 
that public physicians are very unproductive or that, even in 
supposedly high need areas, there is insufficient demand. 
Why did the DRAM modeling effort adopt the postulate of in- 
satiable demand? I suspect that the problem was caused by an un- 
critical interpretation of the literature; an interpretation to 
which some loose language by health service researchers hxs unfor- 
tunately contributed, and an interpretation reenforced by the 
intent to model the British situation. There are actually two 
propositions in the literature (both theoretical and empirical). 
One of them is surely true, while the other is plausibly true 
sometimes and for some types of care, but is subject to consi- 
derable dissent and qualification, and is easily misinterpreted. 
Surely the true proposition is this: if supply is con- 
strained sufficiently(and sufficiently below any plausible level 
of demand), then observed or, in Feldstein's terminology, 
wmanifest" demand, will be determined by supply. The distribu- 
tion of that supply over alternative types of output is then 
subject to the discretion of the HCS. This was the case that 
Feldstein (1967) said he was modeling for the U.K. in his 
classic study of the relationship between hospital beds and 
use, precisely because it was plausible to argue that the supply 
of beds was well below the actual demand for them in the United 
Kingdom. Where supply is less than the actual quantity demanded, 
it is surely going to be the case that increases in bed supply 
will be matched by increases in observed quantities used or 
demanded. This is not, however, "demand creation" in any 
meaningful sense. 
The second argument is that the demand function itself 
is shifted by changes in supply. That is, the amount of care 
that consumers demand, or can be persuaded to demand, is 
somehow influenced by the presence of supply. Figures 1 and 2 
show the distinction between these two arguments. Do in 
Figure 1 shows a given demand curve, with quantity demanded 
as an inverse function of user and/or time price. 
Suppose supply is initially at SO, but total price (user 
price plus time price) is at Po. Then there will be excess 
demand in the amount SoQl,which the system will somehow have 
to ration. (It should not necessarily be supposed that physi- 
cians and hospitals will actually choose to ration out the 
least valuable inputs SOPl , although that is what DRAM implies). 
Now let the budget be increased so that supply can be expanded 
from SO to Sl;observed aggregate use or 'demand" will increase 
proportionately from So to S,. At least up to the resource 
level needed to supply Q units, demand is unsatiated. It is 1 
this situation which DRAM properly (and elegantly) describes. 
To see the second, more controversial case, we begin in 
equilibrium at, say, S1, Dl, and PI in Figure 2. Now let 
supply be increased to S2. The argument cited in support of 
the DRAM assumption (Roemer, 1961, Roemer and Shain, 1959; 
Harris 1975) is that this increase in supply in itself will 
somehow cause a shift in the demand schedule from Dlto, say, 
D 2 .  A serious controversy in North America is whether one 
can conclude that this sort of behavior -- which is quite 
at variance with any kind of neoclassical economic model -- 
does in fact occur' to an important extent. 
It - is generally agreed by health economists that the 
mere finding of a high positive correlation between supply 
and use (the evidence in the above-cited studies) is not 
sufficient to establish the proposition that supply is 
"creating" demand. The problem, as Rosenthal pointed out 
as early as 1964 (Rosenthal, 1964) is that the observation 
is equally consistent with demand "creating" supply, since 
Price 
Figure 1 .  Excess demand and an 
increase  i n  supply. 
Price 
Figure 2 .  Changes i n  demand and p r i c e  and 
an increase  i n  supply. 
i n  equi l ibr ium,  q u a n t i t y  suppl ied  equa l s  q u a n t i t y  demanded. 
S l i g h t l y  more formal ly ,  a s  shown i n  Figure  2 ,  w e  could be ob- 
se rv ing  n o t  "demand c r e a t i o n n ,  b u t  e i t h e r  o f  two c a s e s  which 
mimic demand c r e a t i o n .  W e  could,  f o r  example, be observing 
p o i n t s  P1 and P2 ,  where a  h igher  q u a n t i t y  demanded i s  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  a  lower u s e r  p r i c e  and a  h igher  supply.  [More g e n e r a l l y ,  
w e  could be observing a  change i n  some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  t h e  
good (e .g . ,  q u a l i t y )  o t h e r  than p r i c e . ]  O r  w e  could  b e  ob- 
se rv ing  pointsP1 and P j ,  b u t  wi th  demand s h i f t e d  o u t  by some 
o t h e r  in f luence  on demand, such a s  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  i l l n e s s  l e v e l s ,  
t a s t e s  f o r  medical  c a r e ,  o r  o t h e r  unobserved in f luences .  I f  
supply responds along t h e  supply ' funct ion S1, t h e  a c t u a l  quan- 
t i t y  suppl ied  (and t h e  i n p u t s  used t o  produce t h a t  q u a n t i t y )  
w i l l  be g r e a t e r  when demand i s  g r e a t e r .  
Even i f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of demand c r e a t i o n  be g ran ted ,  and 
even i f  one can exp la in  why and how phys ic ians  ( o r  o t h e r s )  might 
c r e a t e  demand f o r  h o s p i t a l  s e r v i c e s  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  t h e i r  own 
services, t h e  " i n s a t i a b l e  demandm hypothes is  s t i l l  does n o t  
follow. The p o s s i b i l i t y  of  some demand c r e a t i o n  does n o t  imply 
t h e  c e r t a i n t y  of  un l imi ted  demand c r e a t i o n ,  nor  does it imply 
t h a t  p rov ide r s  w i l l  c r e a t e  demand j u s t  because they can do so .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  resources  may be gran ted  t o  s h i f t  
demand outward, b u t  t h e r e  i s  no t h e o r e t i c a l  o r  empi r i ca l  ev i -  
dence f o r  t h e  p ropos i t ion  t h a t  t h e  s h i f t  would b e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  resources .  And y e t  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  would 
s e e m  t o  be  r equ i red  by t h e  i n s a t i a b l e  demand hypothes is .  
To summarize: t h e r e  is a b a s i c  conceptual  problem wi th  
DRAM'S assumption of i n s a t i a b l e  demand. I t  i s  only  l e g i t i m a t e  
i n  cases  i n  which t h e  a n a l y s t  i s  s u r e  t h a t  he  is observ ing  a  
s i t u a t i o n  o f  excess  demand. My empi r i ca l  con jec tu re  he re  is  
t h a t  such s i t u a t i o n s  e x i s t  f o r  h o s p i t a l  c a r e  i n  only some coun- 
t r ies  and f o r  ambulatory v i s i t s  i n  a lmost  no c o u n t r i e s .  A more 
gene ra l  model (of which DRAM would be a  s p e c i a l  c a s e )  i s  one 
t h a t  would inc lude  both demand and supply.  Such a  model would 
permit  ( b u t  n o t  r e q u i r e )  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of excess  demand, and 
would a l s o  permi t  ( b u t  n o t  r e q u i r e )  an a v a i l a b i l i t y  e f f e c t  i n  
-
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  of o t h e r  demand v a r i a b l e s  on use.  The 
c r i t i c a l  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  a  complete s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of demand needs 
t o  be added. 
2.3. Provider Behavior 
A problem with the specific implementation of DRAM is 
its failure to model the behavior of the agents in the system. 
This is especially important with regard to the treatment of 
costs. There are two things _to note here. First, the assump- 
tion of cost minimization (or output maximization, even given 
its division among types of patients) is suspect. There is 
fairly strong empirical evidence to suggest that, for a num- 
ber of reasons, decentralized systems may not choose the in- 
put combinations which minimize costs (Reinhardt, 1972; 
Pauly, 1980a, 1980b). The absence of cost minimization shows 
up as higher costs of lower productivity, but these deviations 
are not random. Instead, they appear to be related to various 
incentives to providers, such as those associated with in- 
surance coverage, method and level of physician compensation, 
etc. It is surely the case that these incentives vary a great 
deal across systems, and I would conjecture that they probably 
vary over time even within systems (and even when there are 
no observable changes in "official" policy). The basic point 
then is that, by omitting incentives, DRAB4 both permits the 
violation of its own assumption of cost minimization and 
(what is probably more important) may lead to erroneous 
forecasts. 
The thrust of this critique is that DRAM is incomplete 
as a generalizable positive model of the health care system. 
That it is incomplete does not, however, mean that it cannot 
be useful. What is needed is to add some further parts to 
-
DRAM, or possibly, for some systems, to either substitute for 
DRAM orchange the way in which DRAM is used. In what follows, 
techniques for doing so will be discussed in detail. 
3. PROBLEMS OF ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
3.1. Introduction 
In this section I want to use some simple diagrams to 
show the kinds of problems that can arise if demand is ignored 
in a forecasting model. The "problems" are of two sorts: 
First, and most importantly, ignoring demand can lead to biased 
estimates of the parameters of DRAM or any other forecasting 
model. Since the validity of a model depends on the validity 
of its parameter estimates, such biased estimates could lead 
to very inaccurate forecasts. Second, in any practical appli- 
cation, it will not be possible to hold all other things equal 
when predicting the changes over time from changing a particu- 
lar variable (e.g., resources). In order to control for such 
changes, some of which may be changes in demand variables, it 
is necessary to know what such variables are and how they 
affect the use of care. 
3.2. The Nature of the Problem 
This discussion will indicate why demand may be an im- 
portant consideration in predicting the impact of changes in 
resource availability on the use of medical care -- the 
primary purpose of DRAM. In most markets, quantity demanded 
and used is thought to be a function of money-user price.While 
this relationship appears to hold for medical care as wel1,money- 
user price is in fact zero in many health care systems. Even in 
the United States, third-party insurance payments(pub1ic and pri- 
vate) cover about 95 percent of hospital costs, though the 
extent to which the remaining 5 percent user charge con- 
strains use and cost is not known. 
That money-user price is zero, or virtually so, does not, 
howevertmean that the quantity demanded is infinite or equal to 
the total population. Many, perhaps most, people would not want 
to live in a hospital even if that were possible, at least 
given the current form and characteristics of hospital care. 
What does seem to be true is that the quantity of hospital care 
demanded (measured, say,by the desired number of admissions) 
appears to be affected by what one might call the "quality" 
or "characteristics" of care. This quality coula mean clinical 
quality, expected travel, or queuing time. Quality could also 
be measured, in the case of hospital care by real inputs per 
admission, as Feldstein (1971) has suggested. 
Quantity of care (e.g., hospital admissions) demanded by 
patients is probably not unlimited for any quality. (It is 
possible, however, that total expenses (quality times quantity) 
and total resource consumption are virtually unlimited. A 
plausible relationship between quality per unit and quantity 
of care demanded is shown in Figure 3 by the line DD'. The 
levels of quantity and quality that can actually be received 
are, however, limited by the resources made available to the 
system. In the diagram, the combinations of quantity and 
quality that can be produced from a given amount of resources 
made available by the government would be shown by such re- 
source lines as R (If quality is available at a constant mar- 0 ' 
ginal cost, these lines will have the equation P-Q = R, where 
P is the number of units of quality, measured in dollars. In 
general, the shape of the resource lines will depend on the 
production function for quantity and quality.) 
Resource lines,R, represent the combinations of quantity and 
quality the HCS could produce with a given level of resources. 
As DRAM describes , we can then imagine the HCS as choosing 
its most preferred point on a resource line by maximizing a 
utility function in quantity and quality subject to the re- 
source contraint. If resources were Ro, the providers' most 
preferred point might then be represented by a point such as 
Po, the tangency of an indifference curve with the resource 
constraint. If the resource constraint is then varied,HCS deci- 
sions will trace out a "supply" locus such as SS'. 
Quality 
per Unit 
I 
I 
Quantity 
Figure 3. Effect of resources on use with a 
single demand curve. 
As long as consumers are willing to accept what providers 
prefer, DRAM will explain behavior. But it is possible that 
consumers are unwilling to demand the output that providers 
choose. In that case, we suppose that actual quantity (or 
quality) used is represented by min(QD, QS), i.e., the mini- 
mum quantity at any level of resources that either the HCS 
is willing to supply or patients are willing to accept. 
If then resources are at Ro, actual quantity will be 
that at Po, and there will be "excess demand" for quantity 
of care in the amount PODO (Conversely, there is an 'excess 
supply" of quality.) This seems to be the sort of situation 
DRAM is intended to represent. Suppose, however, that resources 
are at level R1. Providers would like to be on SS', but now 
demand (at the provider-preferred level of quality) is insuffi- 
cient. Instead, the observation will be at point P1 on line 
DD' . 
If observations are drawn from situations in which resources 
range from Ro to R1, the observed path of equilibria will be 
I 
represented by the heavy line SD . This line will reflect 
neither the preferences of the provider, nor patient demands, 
but rather some ill-defined hybrid of the two. In the simple 
linear framework I have used so far, the line SD' will not be 
well-approximated by any straight line. What is required, 
obviously, is a modeling framework that permits and identifies 
the switch between regimes of excess demand and excess supply. 
The problem becomes more complicated if demand differs 
(say, across areasor over time). For example observations might 
come from the two heavy lines ABC and AB'C' in ~igure 4.   hen 
a single line through those points will not fit well, and will 
not forecast accurately. So it is clear that, at least for 
high resource levels, accurate forecasting or prediction will 
require that one take into account possible differences in 
demand. ~f resource levels vary widely, and if demand 
differs, DRAM will not forecast well. 
Quality 
- 
Figure 4 .  Effect of resources on use with 
several demand curves. 
Quantity 
Of c o u r s e ,  if t h e  q u a n t i t y  a t  which t h e  demand c o n s t r a i n t  
b inds  i s  g r e a t e r  t han  t h e  q u a n t i t y  s u p p l i e d  a t  a v a i l a b l e  l e v e l s  
of  r e s o u r c e s , t h e n  t h e  DRAM model w i l l  s t i l l  be  a p p r o p r i a t e .  A 
s l i g h t l y  more r e a l i s t i c  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  p r o v i d e r ' s  o b j e c t i v e  func- 
t i o n  removes even t h i s  conclusion,however.  Suppose t h a t  t h e  pro- 
v i d e r  has  " s t anda rds"  f o r  q u a n t i t y  and q u a l i t y ,  a s  r ep re sen t ed  
by t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  b u t  suppose t h e  p rov ide r  a l s o  g e t s  
d i s u t i l i t y  from exces s  demand o r  t h e  queues i t s  behavior  
gene ra t e s .  ( A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  one may assume t h a t  t h e  " s t anda rds"  
change wi th  t h e  l e v e l  o f  demand.) The p r o v i d e r  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  
move somewhat away from t h e  s t a n d a r d s  i n  o r d e r  t o  draw down 
exces s  demand. A t  p o i n t  Po i n  F igu re  5 ,  f o r  example, exces s  
demand would be  l a r g e .  The p r o v i d e r  might t h e r e f o r e  f e e l  com- 
p e l l e d  t o  move t o  P i .  I f  t h e  " response"  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
t h e  amount of e x c e s s  demand, t h e  observed set  of  p o i n t s  would 
be r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  heavy l i n e  L1. T h i s  i s  n o t  a problem 
i f  demand i s  c o n s t a n t ,  b u t  suppose t h a t  demand i s  sometimes 
a t  D o ,  sometimes a t  D l ,  and sometimes a t  l e v e l s  i n  between. 
Then t h e  s c a t t e r o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  w i l l  be sp read  between t h e  
heavy l i n e s  through Pi) and Pb', and f o r e c a s t i n g  w i l l  be i m -  
p r e c i s e .  
The message conveyed by t h e s e  examples i s  t h a t  demand 
must be added t o  adequa te ly  e x p l a i n  o r  p r e d i c t  use .  There i s ,  
however, a t h i r d  p o s s i b l e  i n f l u e n c e  which makes it even more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  g e t  an  a c c u r a t e  p r e d i c t i v e  model. T h i s  i n f l u e n c e  
a r i s e s  i f  t h e  r e sou rce  budget  l e v e l s  are n o t  random b u t  are 
s e l e c t e d  by a c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  ( e .g . ,  a n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  
a u t h o r i t y )  based on i t s  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  demand o r  need,  per-  
c e p t i o n s  n o t  p e r f e c t l y  measured by t h e  a n a l y s t .  E s p e c i a l l y  
i n  a c r o s s  s e c t i o n  c o n t e x t ,  one needs t o  ask  why t h e  c e n t r a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  p rov ide  t h e  d i f f e r i n g  l e v e l s  o f  r e sou rces  which 
g e n e r a t e  t h e  d a t a  analyzed.  Here w e  are going t o  assume t h a t  
a l l  p r o v i d e r s  have t h e  same b e h a v i o r a l  f u n c t i o n .  ( I f  p r o v i d e r s  
i n  d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  had d i f f e r e n t  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  t h a t  would cause  
even f u r t h e r  compl ica t ions . )  
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Figure 5 .  Effect of resources on use w i t h  provider 
response to  queues. 
A line such as LL' in Figure 6 represents the opportunity 
locus in one area for the central authority. It must choose 
among points on that line, balancing quantity, quality, the 
total budget, and possibly other objectives. As long as the 
center picks a point on the excess demand segment of the 
opportunity locus, and as long as all HCSs have the same 
preferences, its choices will permit a tracing out of the 
locus implied by those preferences. Problems arise if the 
center selects points in the demand equilibrium segments in 
different areas and demand differs across areas. Suppose, for 
example, that three areas in a country present lines like L', 
L", and L"', because of differences in the incidence of ill- 
ness. The central authorities presumably take that into 
account (alternatively, they get disutility from sick people 
going without care), and so choose the resource levels R', 
R' ', and R' ' ' . Observed points would then be PI, PI ' , P I I I .  
it is obvious that a line MM' fitted threugh these points tells 
one neither about the utility function of providers nor about 
demand; and would be worthless in predicting how use would 
respond if resources were exogenously increased. If illness 
levels, or other demand parameters, are either not perfectly 
observed or not inserted into the model, the problem is one of 
econometric identification. The right-hand variable "resource 
level" will be correlated with the error term, and so its co- 
efficient will be biased. 
L"' 
Quality 
- 
Figure 6. Effect of resources on use with endogenous 
resource budgets. 
Quantity 
4. ECONOMETRIC MODELING OF DEMAND DISEQUILIBRIUM 
In order to indicate what these,observations imply about 
modeling the HCS, I first consider a designedly simple model 
of DIDD, and indicate what a proper econometric specification 
would be. I then compare that specification with what has 
actually been used in the literature (including DRAM), and 
indicate the kinds of biases involved. Subsequent sections 
will discuss more complicated (and less tractable) versions 
of the model. 
4.2. What is Outside the Model 
Before describing the model, I will indicate those parts 
of the HCS which it omits. DIDD is a model of the "market for 
health care", to use Rutten's (1979) terminology. This means 
that it leaves out (or models in only a simple way) the follow- 
ing additional parts of the HCS 
(i) The determination of the level and distribution 
of morbidity and/or symptoms 
(ii) The market for health manpower 
(iii) The market for non-labor inputs 
(iv) The market for health manpower training 
Some of these omissions are more important than others. Topic 
(i) has already been extensively and adequately treated by 
models developed at IIASA, and so need not be developed further. 
Topic (iii) probably can be modeled as simple competitive markets 
(in market economies), and so is not especially interesting. 
Topics (ii) and (iv) are related, and have been subject to 
some analysis at IIASA (Shigan et al., 1979) though not in 
ways which seem especially applicable to market economies. 
I will ussually assume for non-physician manpower that train- 
ing is exogenous, and wage rates are competitively determined. 
For physicians, there will have to be somewhat more explicit 
modeling of topic (ii) contained in DIDD, but I will assume 
again that total supply at any point in time [topic (iv)] is 
exogenous. Obviously the manpower aspects need further speci- 
fication than this model will be able to give. 
4.3. Econometric Specification:Disequilibrium Modeling 
To keep matters simple, let us assume for this section 
that the demand function is not itself affected by suppliers. 
The complications raised by the possibility of supplier -- 
especially physician -- induced demand will be discussed 
below. Let us also assume that preferences of suppliers 
are not affected by the magnitude of excess demand. 
The general econometric specification for markets in 
which disequilibrium occurs has received a great deal of 
attention in recent years (Fair and Jaffee, 1972; Maddala 
and Nelson, 1974; Fair and Kelejian, 1974). This specification 
has been applied to the housing market (Fair and Jaffee, 1972), 
the market for business loans (Laffont and Garcia, 1977) , and 
to centrally planned markets generally (Portes and Winter, 1980). 
It has not, to my knowledge, been applied to the health care 
system, even though the possibility of disequilibrium in such 
markets has been widely noted (Feldstein, 1971; Feldstein, 1977). 
Here I will only describe the fundamental idea of such methods; 
more extensive description can be found in the papers cited. 
The general econometric specification for situations in 
which disequilibrium occurs can be written as 
where QDi is the quantity demanded in observation area (or time 
period) i , QSi is the quantity desired to be supplied in area i, 
'Di is a vector of values of demand variables for area i, XSi 
is a vector of values of supply variables for area i, Qi is the 
actual quantity in area i, and E~ and qi are error terms. 
We cannot estimate the demand and supply relationships 
directly, even assuming that the system is identified, because 
we observe only Q and not QD or QS. If no additional information 
is available, the estimation technique must use a maximum likeLi- 
hood approach,and then must estimate parameters conditional on the 
probability of being in one or the other regime. 
The unconditional (with regard to regime) density of Q i is 
where h, g,, and g2 are the respective frequency distribution, 
with the latter two reflecting the distribution of E and q. 
One then wishes to find parameter estimates to maximize the 
log-likelihood 
L = C log h (Q;) 
Maximum likelihood method are available to do this, although 
it appears that there can be difficulty in finding an algorithm 
to do so. 
This kind of model provides two beneifts. First, it yields 
consistent estimates of the parameters of both demand and supply. 
Second, it also permits estimation of the probability that a 
given observation is in a supply-constrained or a demand- 
constrained regime. 
4.4. Econometric Specification of a Budget-Constrained, Zero 
User Price System 
I now wish to outline a model applying these general 
principles to the HCS. It will be assumed that the user price 
is zero, and that various geographical areas from which obser- 
vations are to be drawn receive budgets of homogeneous resources. 
It is also assumed, of course, that each area represents an in- 
,dependent observation; there is no flow of patients across areas. 
Suppose then that there is an aggregate structural demand 
equation for each area of the form 
where QD is the quantity of care (e.g., hospital admissions) 
demanded by persons in each area, K is quality, and X is a 
vector of other demand variables. 
There is also a production function of the form 
where R is resources and Z is a productivity-shift parameter. 
If R is fixed at R,  one possible observation is the solu- 
tion to 
That is, given E, K is adjusted until QD = Q. So a reduced 
form equation for QD can be written as 
The other possible observation for any area is obtained 
by following the general procedure that DRAM describes. The 
utility function of the HCS is 
where T is "tastes", a shift parameter. V is maximized subject 
- 
to the production function and R = R. Solution to this problem 
is a reduced form equation for Q the quantity desired to be Sf 
supplied, of the form 
(Note that, because the HCS is a monopolist, there is no 
structural supply equation.) The actual observation Q is 
then given by 
It would appear to be feasible to estimate this model by 
the methods described in the preceding section. The demand 
variables and the form of the demand equation could be the 
generalized linear approximation much used in the literature. 
The determination of QS could (especially in this one-input, 
two-output case) also be approximated by a linear relationship, 
and the reduced form itself could be used for forecasting. 
Alternatively, one could estimate the key parameters for DRAM 
itself by the ML technique, and then use DRAM to produce fore- 
casts of QS. 
Once forecasts of QD and QS are obtained, the actual 
forecasted Q will be whichever value is smaller. The fore- 
casted K will then be the value that is consistent with this Q, 
the forecasted values of R,and the other exogenous variables. 
One minor qualification. It is possible for the demand 
equilibrium equation (3) to have multiple solutions. In such 
a case, the relevant Q is the one which is,in some sense, D 
closest to QS. How to define "closeness" operationally may 
sometimes be difficult. 
The econometric problem then is to estimate the functions 
(4) and (6) when it is not known to which function an observa- 
tion corresponds. An Alternative superior to the ML method is 
available if some indicator of the probability of being in 
either regime can be found. For instance, if data on waiting 
lists is available, it seems plausible that Q is more likely 
to equal QS when the waiting list is long than when it is short. 
To incorporate this into the model, we can assume 
where L is the length of the waiting list. 
We must, however, consider one problem with this speci- 
fication. Suppose that R is not exogenous but is instead 
chosen by some central authority according to 
It is clear that, without information on P (preferences), 
the system is not identified, and one cannot get consistent 
estimates of the impact of R in equations (4) and (6) . This 
is a serious problem but one with no obvious empirical solution 
short of getting a set of observations where P differs in a 
measurable way. That is, it may be possible to find some 
exogenous variables unrelated to demand which affect the 
authority's preferred level of R. Perhaps some political or 
historical variables can serve here, or perhaps R is adjusted 
to serve objectives of interregional equity. Then it would 
be possible to make R endogenous, in a two-stage procedure, 
and to proceed with the estimation. 
A further extension, but one that seems much more diffi- 
cult theoretically, is to disaggregate care into various types 
(e.g., for different diseases). This is, of course, the pro- 
blem for which DRAM was designed,but there appear to be serious 
difficulties in developing methods for situations in which there 
are several closely related outputs (either as substitutes or 
complements), and for which some markets may clear while others 
may not. Suppose, for example, the DRAM solution for a given R 
involves providing quantities which leave some markets with ex- 
cess demand (for quantity) and others with excess supply. Then 
DRAM would have to be re-solved with demand constraints inserted. 
Moreover, since demand may depend on the price or quantity of 
close substitutes or complements, it will be necessary to spe- 
cify interactions in the demand system as well as in the HCS 
preference function. I will discuss a very simple model of 
this type at the end of the paper, but for the present it 
should be noted that disaggregation into output types appears 
to be difficult. 
4.5. Excess Demand and Demand Creation in the Literature 
To my knowledge, the disequilibrium specification has not 
been used in the literature on the use of medical care. Instead, 
the procedure has been to estimate either a function labelled 
"demand" or "supply-preference", and then often to add, in 
various ad hoc ways, the influence of the other function. 
Since estimation of "demand" functions is more common, we 
begin with them. The ordinary procedure, used with U.S. (e.g., 
Feldstein, 1971), Canadian (e.g., Evans, 1974), and Dutch 
(e.g., Rutten 1979) data is to estimate a function which relates 
use to a set of demand variables, such as user prices, time price 
proxies, income, indicators of health status, and other socio- 
demographic variables. To this set of variables are then added 
measures of "resource availability", usually hospital beds or 
physicians per capita in the presumed market area. While some- 
times actual values are used in regressions with aggregated use 
data, the possible endogenity of resources (to area demand) is 
handled either by two-stage least squares (Fuchs and Kramer 1973; 
Fuchs 1978) or by using individual rather than aggregated data 
(Newhouse and Phelps, 1976; Pauly, 1980b). 
The explanations for what a significant coefficient on 
such availability measures is supposed to represent are varied. 
Sometimes a permanent excess demand story is told (Feldstein, 
1971). Sometimes it is argued that, because of the stochastic 
nature of demand, markets are sometimes in excess demand, so 
that aggregated by time (e.g., hospital days or admissions per 
year) will reflect some excess demand (Newhouse, 1974; Newhouse 
and Phelps, 1976; Pauly, 1980b, Chapter 6). Most often, the 
argument is that resources somehow create the demand for them- 
selves (Fuchs, 1978; Evans, 1974), though this argument is 
much stronger for physician stock, physician services, and 
complementary hospital admissions than for hospital resources 
and hospital services (Pauly, 1980b). 
In virtually every case, resource availability measures 
are simply entered into a catch-all regression. The only 
attempt to say anything rigorous about the relationship be- 
tween theory and specification is by Newhouse (1974) (who 
argues in the excess demand case that one ought to take the 
square root of resource measures) and by Pauly (1980h) who 
attempts, on wholly a priori grounds, to divide his sample 
into areas in which excess demand is more or less likely to 
prevail. This procedure is useful for hypothesis testing 
but not for prediction. 
There is not a clear dividing line between demand function 
estimates and supply-production function estimates. For example, 
the Evans and Rutten papers actually focus much more on physi- 
cian preferences and effects on demand generation than on de- 
mand variables as such; they might better be called "patient 
flow" functions than demand functions. But even at the end 
of the spectrum as represented by production functions, 
Reinhardt (1 972) and Pauly (1 980b) at least experimented 
with inserting per physician demand proxies, again in an 
ad hoc way. 
There are two potential problems with these ad hoc methods: 
(1) Parameter estimates will be biased 
(2) Standard errors will be inflated 
Coefficients on variables that appear only in the demand function 
(e.g., income or time price) or only in the HCS preference func- 
tion (e.g., indicators of tastes) will be biased toward zero. 
The estimated coefficient on resources itself will, in the case 
shown in the diagrams, tend to be in between the coefficient 
in the demand function and'the coefficient in the provider pre- 
ference function. Standard errors will be inflated because one 
is trying to estimate two functions with only one relationship. 
In the DRAM model, demand is not explicitly included. It 
is included implicitly in the sense that the targets might rea- 
sonably be affected by at least some of the determinants of 
demand, such as the prevalence of illness. Other influences -- 
travel and waiting time, income, sociodemographic variables, and 
quality -- all of which have been found to influence demand, are 
ignored, presumably on the ground that such non-medical variables 
will never be at a level that demand will fall short of supply. 
4.6. Econometric Specification in Market Economies 
While.the preceding analysis was developed for the case of 
a budget-constrained, zero user-price system, similar observations 
applywhen user price is not zero and the budget is constrained 
by demand at that nonzero price, as well as by a requirement 
that the HCS break even. Here two regimes are possible. In 
one, only demand operates as a constraint, Of the form 
A 
where P = NINS. P is the user price of care, NINS is the fraction 
not covered by insurance, and P is the gross price. "~reak even" 
for the HCS implies that 
where C(.) is a total cost function. That is, the HCS must 
receive enough revenue to cover its costs. (A  subsidy could 
obviously be added.) If there are constant returns to scale 
(11) implies 
P = =(K, Z) or price equals average cost (12) 
Maximizing V(Q, K, T) given the constraints (10) and (12) 
then yield the equilibrium values of Q and K for the HCS. This 
model is the same as that suggested by Newhouse (1970) and 
Feldstein (1971). Here there is no possibility of excess demand, 
since quality is always adjusted so that QD = as. Excess demand 
would mean that the HCS was not obtaining as high .a quality or 
quantity level as it could. (This is not to deny that some out- 
side decisionmaker may want it to have lower quality.) The 
actual content and form of the utility function, and whether 
it can depend on some more specific and observable arguments 
(such as physician income) has been the major unsettled question 
in the literature on U.S. hospitals; one I shall discuss in an- 
other paper. For the present, it is sufficient to work with 
this general form. One can, however, use this form to ask 
how use will change as some of the parameters (e.g., NINS) 
change; the implication is that the change depends primarily 
on the demand function, though provider preferences also matter. 
A picture of such an equilibrium is shown in Figure 7. 
Here the line DD' shows the combinations of quantity and quality 
which satisfy the demand constraint (10) and the breakeven 
straint (12). In contrast to the zero user-price case, when the 
DD' curve was likely to have a positive or vertical slope, here 
the fact that a user price must be paid causes the curve even- 
tually to have a negative slope. The otherwise unconstrained 
utility-maximizing hospital then selects a point (such as P*) 
of tangency of its indifference curve to this opportunity locus. 
This point must ,of course, be in the negatively sloped portion of DD' . 
An interesting and relevant case is one in which, in addi- 
tion to demand and break-even constraintstthe provider or sys- 
tem is also subject to a maximum revenue constraint. Such a 
constraint was proposed by President Carter (though defeated 
by Congress) in order to contain hospital costs; it also forms . 
part of Sen. Kennedy's National Health Insurance plan. In 
such a situation, the demand and break-even constraints would 
still hold, but, in addition, there would be a maximum revenue 
constraint 
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Figure 7. Effect of resources on use with user prices. 
Possible outcomes for two alternative configurations of 
HCS preferences (or relative costs of quantity and quality) 
are shown in Figure 7. For example, if the resource limit 
is Ro and HCS preferences are represented by the indifference 
curve 10, then point Po would be the observed quantity-quality 
combination. Up to point P1 (and resource limit R1), outcomes 
would be determined by HCS preferences, as DRAM describes. 
Beyond R1, however, outcomes are constrained by the demand- 
break-even locusDDU. Finally, if the resource limit is in- 
creased beyond R2 (the line through P*), there is no effect 
on outcome, because at that point the resource limit ceases 
to be binding. The locus of observed points would then be 
the heavy line LPIP*. ~lternatively, for a different con- 
figuration of HCS preferences, the path could look like LUP;P*. 
One way to think of the solution is to think of the HCS 
as now choosing among 
(a) QS, the quantity that maximizes V subject only to 
constraint ( 13) 
- 
A 
(b) QD, the quantity that maximizes V given h(QD,KD,R,P)=O 
(c) Q*, the quantity that maximizes V given constraints (10) 
and (12) 
Practically, outcome (c) seems unlikely, since it implies 
that the revenue constraint is not binding. But the problem 
of choosing ( a )  or (b is then the same as in the zero user 
cost case, except that 
(a) The user price is added to the demand function 
(b) There may not be a monotonic relationship between 
quantity (or quality) and the resource limit 
(c) There is some value of the limit beyond which an 
increase in the limit leaves behavior unaffected 
If one thinks then of estimating the effect of changes 
in the revenue limit on admissions (or on quality), there are 
in a sense three different regimes: 
(1) A regime in which HCS preferences (e.g., as modeled 
by DRAM) determine outcomes 
( 2 )  A regime in which observations trace out the hospi- 
tals' break-even constraint. Such a relationship can 
be nonlinear and nonmonotonic 
( 3 )  A regime in which changes in R do not affect hospital 
behavior 
If only regimes (1) and (2) usually hold, a modification 
of the approach from the previous section could be used. Per- 
haps there is enough information in the problem to also permit 
an estimate of the likelihood of being in regime ( 3 ) .  Some 
econometric problems obviously remain. 
4.7. Conclusion 
Recent research in the demand for medical care seems to 
be moving in the direction of including more quality measures 
or adjusting for quality in some way (Feldstein, 1977). If 
this trend continues, the proper modeling of the demand 
constraint would be all the more useful. And as even mar- 
ket-oriented systems move toward budgetary limitations and 
supply constraints, it will be more essential to distinguish 
equilibrium from disequilibrium and to characterize disequili- 
brium. Econometric techniques are available to permit this to 
be done. 
The technique suggested above does more than just permitmore 
accurate parameter estimates. It also permits estimation of 
the probability that a given observation is in supply-constrained 
disequilibrium or not. So it might provide a useful tool for 
estimating the actual impact of regulatory or cost containment 
devices, and for describing how that impact varies across pro- 
viders or areas. 
5. INCENTIVES AND PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY I N  HEALTH PLANNING 
MODELS 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The supp ly  o r  p r o v i d e r  p r e f e r e n c e  s i d e  o f  t h e  model j u s t  
d e s c r i b e d  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  how t h e  a g e n t s  i n  t h e  HCS 
c o n v e r t  r e s o u r c e s  i n t o  o u t p u t s .  DRAM i s  one way of  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  and c o u l d  i n  f a c t  be used t o  f o r e c a s t  t h e  QS i n  
e q u a t i o n  ( 6 )  (once unb iased  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  pa ramete r s  had 
been o b t a i n e d )  . * 
But t h e s e  methods whol ly  i g n o r e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  whether  
it always t a k e s  t h e  same amount o f  r e s o u r c e s  t o  produce a 
g iven  b a t c h  o f  o u t p u t s .  Tha t  i s ,  t h e y  assume t h a t  p roduc t i on  
e f f i c i e n c y  [measured by t h e  v a r i a b l e  Z i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 ) l  was 
everywhere and a lways  t h e  same. There  is  f a i r l y  s t r o n g  empi- 
r i c a l  e v idence ,  however, t h a t  
( a )  A g iven  b a t c h  o f  measured medica l  o u t p u t  can  be pro-  
duced w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e  combina t ions  o f  i n p u t s  
( b )  A g iven  b a t c h  o f  o u t p u t s  i s  sometimes produced w i t h  
more o r  less a l l  o f  t h e  i n p u t s  ( t e c h n i c a l  i n e f f i c i e n c y )  
(c) I n p u t s  a r e  n o t  always chosen t o  minimize c o s t s  ( t o  
maximize o u t p u t  f o r  a g iven  money budget)  
* 
There a r e  o t h e r ,  p o s s i b l y  s i m p l e r ,  ways o f  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s  
p r o c e s s .  For  example, one cou ld  e s t i m a t e  a se t  o f  "HCS demand 
f o r  o u t p u t "  r e g r e s s i o n s  of t h e  g e n e r a l  form 
Qi = CONSTi + aiBEDS + BiDOCS + yiBEDS x DOCS 
where Q i s  t h e  amount of o u t p u t  i ( e . g . ,  admiss ions  f o r  upper  
r e s p i r a k o r y  i n f e c t i o n s )  and BEDS and DOCS a r e  h o s p i t a l  and phy- 
s i c i a n  r e s o u r c e s  i n  p h y s i c a l  terms. I f  r e s o u r c e s  w e r e  p rov ided  
i n  t h e  form of  money budge t s ,  t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  would 
be t h e  amount o f  t h e  budget  and t h e  p r i c e s  o f  i n p u t s  o r  of  
o u t p u t s .  
It would seem that the specification of the relationship between 
Z and observable institutional structures should be part of a 
general HCS model. 
The empirical importance of such measured inefficiency is 
not known, nor is the extent to which it may represent a change 
in some unmeasured quality of output. It is known that cost- 
liness and productivity varies in predictible ways with in- 
centives to providers. 
For example (Table I), taken from Reinhardt, Pauly, Held 
(1979), indicates the relationship between inputs and output 
in the production function for physician office visits for 
a sample of U.S. medical groups. Output is measured by the 
logarithm of the number of patient visits. The critical 
variable there for purposes of this discussion are two measures 
of the closeness of the link between physician income and pro- 
ductivity, INCOPROD and PRODDIST. Either measure is statis- 
tically significant, with positive coefficients. The coeffi- 
cients imply that changing the relationship from the bottom 
(no relationship between productivity and income) to the top 
(strong relationship between productivity and income) will 
raise weekly office visits by 20 percent. 
A planning model ought to include consideration of such 
aspects of productive efficiency for two reasons: 
(1) Variations in efficiency can lead to errors in 
forecasting the relationship between resources 
and output. 
(2) Knowing how to increase output by reducing identi- 
fiable sources of inefficiency is often highly de- 
sirable information for planners, since it permits 
them to do more with less. 
Table 1. Group practice study: two-stage-least-squares 
estimates of office visit production function. 
Description of Variable Acronym Estimated Regression ~ o e f  f ic ienta  
Equation 1 Equation 2 
Practice Inputs 
N m k r  of hours Dr.X spent a t  the off ice seeing LBOAILSF 
pat ients ,  l a s t  7 calendar days (logarithm) 
N m k r  of examination roams i n  the group par 
ITE WD (logarithm) 
Weekly hours of non-physician medical personnel 
per FTE ME i n  the group (includes graduate . BILSMED 
physician ass i s tan t s ,  registered nurses, 
licensed prac t ica l  nurses, and technicians) 
Weekly hours of administrative personnel, per 
FI'E MD i n  the group (includes business a b i n i s -  BRSAm 
t r a t o r ,  sec re ta r ia l  personnel and others) 
Total weekly hours of support s t a f f ,  squared Ei?SlWrSQ - 0.611 x lo-'*** - 0.618 x lo-'*** 
Physician Character is t ics  
Number of years since graduation from medical YRSGRAD 
school 
Number of years since graduation from medical 
school, sqrrared Y-Q 
Medical special ty  of physician: 
General p rac t i t ioner  (Yes = 1) 
Pediatrician (Yes - 1) 
OB/GYN s p e c i a l i s t  (Yes = 1) 
Physician's own assessment of his/her responsive- 
ness t o  monetary incentives (converted t o  a dumy 
variable s e t  t o  1 i f  the physician declares h i m /  OWNRESP 
herself responsive t o  monetary reward, 0 otherwise) 
Characteristics of the Physician's Group Practice 
of pract ice (dummy variable s e t  t o  1 i f  HULTSPEC 
a multispecialty group, 0 otherwise) 
S i re  of group, measured by nrnnber of FPE MDs . 
practicing i n  the  group (logarithm) LNGRPSIZ* 
I 9  any graduate physician ass i s tan t  employed 
by the group (Yes - 1, No 0 0)  GPA 
Percentage of group's incane dis t r ibuted t o  
numbers on the basis  of productivity PRDDDIST* 
Scale f r m  1 t o  10 indicating the closeness INCOPROD* 
of the link between the individual owner- 
mesber's incame and his/her productivity 
(1 - not re la ted ,  10 = nrmpletely related)  
Binary variable s e t  t o  1 i f  50% or  more of 
the group's revenue came fram prepayment, PQMO* 
0 otherwise 
Constant Term (Intercept) 
Represents i n t e r n i s t s  i n  s ingle  specialty 
groups with PCHHO = 0 and GPA = 0 
Statistics 
2 R (adjusted for  degrees of freedan; 0.37 0.38 
icegression F-s ta t i s t i c  (16,786) 35.57 36.42 
Number of observations 803 803 
t~ rar iable  whose acronym i s  asterisked is treated as  an endogenous regressor. 
a ~ t a t i s t i c a l  significance level  of coefficients: ***less tnan 1 t ;  "less than 58; *less  than 109. Coefficients 
without an as te r i sk  are not s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i ~ ~ l f i c a n t l y  different  from zero a t  a level of 101 or  l ess .  
b ~ c t u a l  significa!ce level is  1.85%. 
C ~ c t u a l  significance level is  2.39%. 
dSignificilnce leve l  exceeds 909. 
Source: Reinhardt ,  Pauly, and Held (1979). 
5.2. Production Efficiency and Incomplete Budgeting 
In some countries, medical resources are not all subject 
to public budgeting or control. For example, a country may 
control the supply of physicians, but not the level of re- 
sources the physician chooses to hire. If this level varies, 
and if output is affected by the use of ancillary personnel, 
output may be difficult to forecast by knowing only the 
publicly determined inputs. If the provider may be assumed 
to be a cost minimizer-profit-maximizer, it is possible to 
specify a supply function for his services as depending on 
output prices and input prices. An aggregate supply function 
then depends on the number of providers,aswell as the prices 
of inputs and outputs. If the provider deviates from cost 
minimization in ways which are related to identifiable 
variables, these variables can also be included in the 
supply functions. The critical point, however, is that 
forecasting e#ither total services or their division over 
types of outputs requires forecasting the vector of output 
prices, the vector of input prices, and the values of effi- 
ciency shift variables. Where output prices are set exo- 
genously, one also must be concerned with the level of 
demand as well as the level of supply in order to forecast 
use. 
6. PHYSICIAN EFFECTS ON DEMAND IN A DISEQUILIBRIUM SPECIFICATION 
6.1. Introduction 
The preceding sections have treated the demand for medical 
care as if it were like the demand for any other commodity; the 
analysis could equally well have been applied to publicly pro- 
vided housing, publicly provided transportation, or any other 
good with qualitative dimensions. The demand for medical care, 
in the previous discussion, could either be satisfied or not, 
but its use was independent of the level of excess demand or 
excess supply; its use depended only on the constrained-utility- 
maximizing behavior of consumers. 
One unusual characteristic of the demand for medical care, 
much discussed in the literature, is that it may be subject to 
permanent manipulation by providers in an important way. It 
is usually supposed that the physician, in the rule of advice- 
giver or agent for the patient, can engage in the activity of 
"demand creation". It is further supposed that he is likely 
to do so to an extent which depends upon the excess supply of 
his own services or of other services. 
While the literature on this subject is extensive (and 
growing), it is not particularly clear or conclusive. One 
reason for this, I believe, has been the tendency to model 
this relationship as one of agency. While this approach was 
perhaps sparked by Feldstein's (1974) suggestion, and while 
it is useful in some circumstances (cf. Pauly, 1979), my view 
is that it leads to an empirically inappropriate attempt to 
divide medical services into those that are patient determined 
(suchas the initial decision to contact a physicianland those that 
are wholly physician determined (such as decisions on consul- 
tations, revisits, hospitalization, or surgery). The second 
set of decisions involve a much larger share of health resources. 
It.may not be appropriate to view these decisions as entirely 
physician determined. A better approach is to view the 
physician as providing advice and certification, but with the 
ultimate decision being made by the patient (even if he decides 
to rely wholly on the physician's advice). It is possible, for 
example, to model the process in a Bayesian framework, and then 
permit a whole range of patient prior preferences and reactions 
to physician advice (Pauly, 1980b). 
In an informal sense, all decisions after the initial con- 
tact reflect some mix of patient and physician preferences, and 
one should incorporate both the mix and the preferences into 
the explanation of use. There is sufficient evidence of patient 
noncompliance with physician "orders", and of patient rationality 
in the initial selection of the physician who will give advice 
(Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1980) to reject the model of wholly 
physician-determined behavior. Of course, there are some con- 
sumption decisions, such as receipt of a prescription drug or 
admission to hospital, which the physician must order, but the 
point is that physician preferences for a particular type of 
use are necessary but not sufficient for that use to occur. 
Demand creation implies that physicians prefer more use 
than patients would prefer if they knew what the physician 
knew. The easiest way to model things is to assume that the 
physician provides advice to which the patient can react. 
What the physician can do, however, is alter the content or 
accuracy of that advice depending on the reward (financial or 
otherwise) to him from one pattern of patient care use as com- 
pared to another, and depending on how'patients respond to 
various levels of accuracy. 
A simple way of seeing how this works is presented in 
Figure 8. Here we assume that the physician who provides 
advice on recommended services also performs those services 
himself, and that services and physicians are homogenous. 
(Circumstances in which the physician prefers to or is required 
to refer to other physicians will be ignored.) The critical 
ideal is that the demand for a physician's services may depend 
on the accuracy of his advice. 
Price 
Po 
PT 
- 
Q Q Q,M" Quantity for Dr. A 
Figure 8. Demand creation in medical markets. 
If the physician's advice was as accurate or truthful 
(given his current know1edge)asitcould be, he would experience 
some demand curve such as DT. But over some range, the physi- 
cian can cause the amount demanded from him at various levels 
of user price (including zero) to change by changing his accu- 
racy. 
There is, however, some maximum quantity that people are 
willing to take from a given physician,no matter what he says; 
this is represented by Dmax. The position of Dmax is deter- 
mined both by consumer's prior distribution and likelihood 
functions, and, in some long-run sense, by the individual 
physicians' reputation with regard to accuracy. That is, 
Dmax can be close to DT because 
(1) Consumers are virtually certain about the preferred 
course of treatment, and so ignore inaccurate advice 
(2) Consumers probability distributions are little affected 
by what physicians say (even if they are quite uncer- 
tain) 
(3) Inaccurate information will be discovered, exposed, 
and lead consumers to switch physicians, reducing 
the long-run pay off to the physician of inaccurate 
advice 
Between DT and Dmax, the physician can determine the demand 
curve he will face. We assume that the marginal cost of his 
output, including both the explicit costs of inputs he hires 
(office staff), and a money measure of the opportunity cost 
of his time, is represented by MC. Assume for simplicity that 
the physician takes the gross fee he receives as fixed (either 
by government or by professional consensus). Then we can des- 
cribe three possible regimes characterizing the observed re- 
lationship between gross price and use. 
If gross price is below P T' the situation is unequivocally 
one of excess demand. The physician might as well give accurate 
advice (unless he wants to "destroy" demand to avoid the 
imprecations of unsatisfied demanders), but he is not willing 
or able to permit that demand to be satisfied. 
The difference between this model andone of simple excess 
demand or supply becomes apparent if the fee exceeds PT. 
Suppose, for example, that price is at Po. Quantity could be 
Q:, or yX, or anything in between depending on the value of 
accuracy the physician selects. (If he were only interested 
in net income, he would move the demand curve out to the Dmax 
curve here and for all prices above P 
max 
) In order to explain 
what level of accuracy the physician will choose, a number of 
models (Evans, 1974; Sloan and Feldman, 1977; Pauly 1980b) 
assume that the physician gets disutility from providing in- 
accurate advice. Then he chooses the level of accuracy by 
balancing off the increase in his net income from shifting the 
demand curve against the disutilityfrom providing less and 
less accurate advice. If the marginal disutility from inaccu- 
racy increases and (eventually) the shift in demand for a mar- 
ginal reduction in accuracy decreases, there is likely to be 
T max an interior maximum between QO and Q0 , such as at Q3. The 
location of this point will depend on the physician's utility 
function, his income, the reward for creating demand (P-MC), 
and the impact of accuracy on demand. 
The set of observed points will therefore follow the 
heavy line in Figure 8. At fee levels below PT, the supply 
or MC curve is traced out. Above PT, the curve represents 
neither a demand curve nor a supply curve, and it is therefore 
difficult to specify its shape precisely. Because it diverges 
from DT but cannot cross Dmax, the curve above PT could be 
thought of as having two segments: a segment with a slope less 
than either demand curve (possibly positive, as shown in the 
diagram from PT to PR), and eventually a segment roughly 
paralleling or asymptotic to one or the other demand curve 
(shown in the diagram above PR). In this sense, then, there 
are roughly three regimes: 
(1) A regime of excess demand, when the fee is below 
P~ 
(2) A regime when use is mainly determined by provider 
preferences and utilities, although demand has some 
influence 
(3) A regime in which use is primarily determined by 
demand 
The distinction between (2) and (3) is not as sharp as that 
between (1) and (2), since both demand and provider preferences 
will determine use for all prices in excess of PT, but it does 
nevertheless seem useful (at least if one is using linear 
approximations) to try to distinguish the two segments. 
This model has been developed for a system in which 
patients pay some user charges. But even if care is free 
of money-user charges, the story is much the same, except 
that, given accuracy, the demand curves now become perfectly 
inelastic with respect to the price paid to the physician. 
These can, however, be a second round effect if patient demand 
for visits is a function of physician service quality. The 
physician can then obtain patients either by changing the accu- 
racy of his advice or the quality of services he provides. 
In terms of the figures in section 3, we need only label the 
"Dm curves DT, redrawn in Figure 9. Up to %, the physician 
will tell the truth and the mix of services will be wholly 
determined by his preferences. Over the range RTRmax, as 
drawn, demand will be created and use will depend on a com- 
bination of provider and patient preferences, along with vari- 
ables which reflect the desire and the ability of the physician 
to create demand. Above Rmax, the scatter of observations 
traces out the demand curve Dmax. (The curve could asymptoti- 
cally approach D 
max ' 
) "Higher resources" here have a different 
result depending on whether they are used to pay for more phy- 
sicians' services (at a given unit price), pay a higher unit 
price, or provide non-physician resources. 
Quality 
- 
Figure 9. Effect of resources on use w i t h  
demand creation. 
Quantity 
6.2. A Formal Econometric Specification of the Three Regime 
Mode 1 
Let us consider the simple case in which P is fixed at 
- 
P. Demand can be written as 
where A is the accuracy of the advice given by the physician. 
For simplicity it is assumed that there is only one input MI 
so the production function is just 
There are four critical levels of output Q: 
* 
1. Let QS be the level given by 
- 
Max IT = PQ - W(M) OM 
QIM 
where W(M) is the marginal opportunity cost of physician input, 
an increasing function of M. Here Q is assumed to be uncon- 
strained by demand, so that Q% corresponds to the amount that 
a competitive profit-maximizing firm facing price would 
choose to supply. 
2 .  Let Qmax be the level given by 
Max Q~ = a@, x. A) 
A 
So Qmax correspond to points along the Dmax curve. 
h 
3. Let Q be the level given by 
Max V(T, A) 
AtQtfi1 
subject to the production function and demand constraints. 
4. Finally, let QT = QD(F, X, 4 )  where 4 is "truee" advice, 
i.e., the maximum possible value for A. 
The three regimes can now be described. 
* * 
Regime I: Excess demand. Iffat P, QS < QT, then Q = QS. 
Here the amount that the physician is willing to supply, even 
if he is unconcerned about the accuracy of advice, is less 
than that demanded when fully accurate advice has been given. SO 
he may as well provide accurate information, but there will 
be excess demand. 
* 
Regime 11: Discretionary Demand Creation. If, at P, QS > QT 
A 
and Qs < QmaXf then Q = Gs. 
Demand is being created, and the amount of output depends on 
the preferences of the provider and the response of the patient 
to information. 
* 
Regime 111. Maximal Demand. If, at P, QS QT and QS %ax 
Here demand has been pushed out as far as it can, and so it 
tracks the Dmax curve. The provider may not reach this regime, 
depending Qn his preferences and the consumer's response. 
In Regime (I), use would be wholly explained by supply 
variables: output price, input price, provider preferences, 
and parameters of the production function. In Regime (1111, 
use would be wholly explained by demand variables: output 
price, income, illness levels, tastes, with possibly some 
variables reflecting the ability of the typical patient to 
detect inaccurate advice (Pauly, 1980b) . Finally, in Regime (11) , 
use would depend on both demand and supply variables. In 
addition, any parameters describing the utility function V, 
which might reflect the willingness of the typical physician 
to trade off income and accuracy, should be included. 
It would seem that maximum likelihood methods could be 
used to distinguish among these regimes, assuming that the 
system is otherwise identified. 
7. A MODEL OF INTERACTIVE DEMANDS USING DIDD 
7.1. Introduction 
Now I want to consider a somewhat more complex but.nore 
realistic model in which there are two levels or types of 
providers -- primary providers and secondary providers. There 
will be some relationship between the demand for the services 
of one type of provider and the price or supply of services 
of the other type of provider. If neither market were ever 
in excess demand, the demand function would be specified in 
the usual way -- by including user prices of closely related 
goods in the demand function for each good. Such an approach 
has been used in the literature (Davis and Russell 1972), but 
it has also been remarked that some of these markets, especially 
the one for primary case, may be characterized by excess demand. 
Then, as Feldstein (1971) has noted, it is not appropriate to 
put price into the demand function. If these related markets 
are always characterized by excess demand, then the appropriate 
measure would be the one Feldstein actually uses -- the supply 
of such resources. 
But if the markets for related goods are sometimes charac- 
terized by excess supply, sometimes by equilibrium, and sometimes 
by excess demand, a disequilibrium approach is called for. More- 
over, if excess supply leads to demand manipulation, this possi- 
bility would need to be incorporated too. Even in non-fee-for- 
service, zero user-price markets, interaction effects are likely to 
t o  be p r e s e n t .  F i n a l l y ,  it would s e e m  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  
o u t p u t s  by t y p e  of  p r o v i d e r  a l o n e  may be  mi s l ead ing ,  s i n c e  
a  p r o v i d e r  may produce some o u t p u t s  t h a t  a r e  complements t o  
a n o t h e r  o u t p u t  and o t h e r  o u t p u t s  t h a t  a r e  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  it. 
For  t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  it seems u s e f u l  t o  o u t l i n e  a  model 
w i t h  b o th  s t a g e s  o r  t y p e s  of  p r o v i d e r s ,  and t y p e s  of  o u t p u t .  
Such a  model a l s o  p e r m i t s  a  new u s e  o f  D W .  
7 . 2 .  Assumptions and S t r u c t u r e  
I t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  two t y p e s  o f  p r o v i d e r :  a  
pr imary c a r e  p r o v i d e r  and a  secondary  c a r e  p r o v i d e r .  A person 
can  o b t a i n  c a r e  from t h e  second t y p e  o f  p r o v i d e r  o n l y  a f t e r  
hav ing  r e c e i v e d  a t  l e a s t  some s e r v i c e s  from t h e  f i r s t  t y p e .  
There a r e  t h r e e  k i n d s  of  o u t p u t ,  w i t h  each  k i n d  be ing  
p rov ided  t o  p a t i e n t s  o f  v a r i o u s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  The second 
t y p e  of p r o v i d e r  p rov ide s  o u t p u t  C ( c o n s u l t a n t s '  s e r v i c e s ) ,  
a  v e c t o r  w i t h  e lements  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  amount o f  C g iven  t o  
p a t i e n t s  w i t h  each  set o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  The f i r s t  t y p e  
of  p r o v i d e r  produces  two v e c t o r s  o f  o u t p u t s :  d i a g n o s i s  and 
recommendation (D) and t r e a t m e n t  ( T ) .  I n  o r d e r  t o  r e c e i v e  
any T o r  C ,  a  p a t i e n t  must have a t  l e a s t  some D; people  
u s u a l l y  must c o n t a c t  a  pr imary p r o v i d e r  t o  g e t  secondary-  
l e v e l  c a r e .  ( I n  r e a l i t y ,  a  s i z e a b l e  p o r t i o n  o f  s p e c i a l i s t s '  
b u s i n e s s  i n  t h e  U.S. comes from p a t i e n t s  who i n i t i a t e  t h e  
c o n t a c t  themse lves  w i thou t  r e f e r r a l ,  b u t  t h a t  w i l l  be ignored  
h e r e .  ) 
I t  w i l l  n o t  be assumed e i t h e r  t h a t  p a t i e n t s  a lways  do  
what d o c t o r s  recommend o r  t h a t  d o c t o r s  always recommend what 
p a t i e n t s  want. I n  t h i s  s imple  f i r s t  v e r s i o n ,  I w i l l  however 
i g n o r e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  demand inducement.  
To c o n s t r u c t  such a  model, I assume t h a t  b o t h  pr imary 
and secondary  p r o v i d e r s  ( GP  and S, r e s p e c t i v e l y )  r e c e i v e  f i x e d  
budgets .  Such an  assumpt ion would r e p r e s e n t  s a l a r i e d  p r o v i d e r s  
a t  b o t h  l e v e l s .  The budge t s  or s a l a r i e s  s p e c i f y  t o t a l  i n p u t s  
(e.g., how many hours the provider must work) but not how in- 
puts should be divided over outputs. Technical efficiency in 
production is assumed. 
The GP's Problem. Let D be a vector if diagnostic ser- 
vices for various illnesses or conditions and T a vector of 
treatment services. The GP's problem is to maximize V(D,T) 
subject to a simple production function 
(where M is total hours and t is the number of treatments per 
diagnosis) and demand functions 
(where X2 and Xg are demand variables) and a resource limit 
Given the chosen levels of D and t, the pattern of referrals 
to S for C depends on the mix of diagnostic and treatment 
services provided by the GP. That is 
CR = f (D, t) 
where CR is the number of referrals to the consultant and 
The sign on the total derivative captures two influences: 
(a) when t is increased, patients have fewer conditions 
left untreated to refer to specialists 
(b) when t is increased, given M, less time is available 
for D, so fewer new patients are seen, and fewer 
conditions discovered. 
Thus D is complementary to C, while t (and T) is a substitute 
for C. 
The Specialists' Problem. The specialists' problem is to 
maximize 
subject to a production function 
where S is specialist resources and a demand function 
(where CD is the number of speicalists' services demanded and 
X3 is a set of variables reflecting the patients' compliance 
with recommendations) and a resource constraint 
The critical point then is that the queue from which the 
consultant selects, and the character of patients in that 
queue (in terms of their "needn for C) depends on decisions 
made by the GP. If the GP sees many different patients and 
treats them superficially, CD will be large. If he sees 
only a few new patients, and treats them intensively, CD will 
be small. It also means that one cannot predict a priori the 
impact of GP supply (an increase in aggregate E) on C; that 
depends on how GP's allocate the initial resources between D 
and t. C will nevertheless depend on M, the number of GP's. 
and also on what motivates GP's. Hence, forecasting secondary 
level care requires consideration of GP numbers, resources, and 
preferences, as well as patient demands. 
If, instead of receiving a fixed budget or salary, the 
GP receives fee-for-service reimbursement, then the level 
of M will not be fixed. Rather, it will depend upon the 
levels of PD and PT. Moreover, the mix of services will 
depend upon the relative fee level PD/PT. As PD falls re- 
lative to PT, the GP will take in fewer new cases, and treat 
the ones he does take more intensively himself, thus resulting 
in fewer referrals to specialist, and ultimately less specialist 
business. Here the pattern of use of specialists will depend 
on absolute and relative fee levels, as well as on whatever 
clinical standards physicians may value and the number of GP's. 
8. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
In this section I will discuss the kinds of variables that 
one might want to include in demand functions. This will 
naturally raise the issue of disaggregation into types of medi- 
cal care and types of providers, and the relationships across 
markets for different types of services. 
The purpose of this discussion will be to indicate the 
general classes of variables to be used. The specific measures 
will obviously depend upon the institutional structure and data 
availability in various countries. 
In broad terms, we can distinguish seven general types of 
influences on individual's demand for a particular type of 
medical care. These are 
(1) Illness or state of health measures 
(2) Money and non-money prices of the type of care 
( 3 )  Money and non-money prices of substitutes or comple- 
ments to the particular type of care 
(4) Income 
(5) Advice or information from physicians and friends 
( 6 )  Demographic v a r i a b l e s  
( 7 )  Other  t a s t e  v a r i a b l e s  
A b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  each  t y p e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  i s  i n  o r d e r .  
I w i l l  c o n c e n t r a t e  on measures f o r  p r e d i c t i n g  average  u se  i n  
a market a r e a .  Hea l t h  s t a t u s  measures have been found t o  be 
impor tan t  i n f l u e n c e s  on i n d i v i d u a l  u s e  of medical  c a r e .  How 
impor tan t  t h e y  a r e  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  a c r o s s  a r e a s  o r  
i n  a r e a  means ove r  t i m e  i s  a much more open q u e s t i o n .  I n  most 
developed c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  most e a s i l y  a v a i l a b l e  h e a l t h  s t a t u s  
measures -- i n f a n t  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  and d e a t h  rates -- va ry  
t o o  l i t t l e  and/or a r e  n o t  e s p e c i a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  medical  
c a r e  use .  But t h e  measures used i n  i n d i v i d u a l  s t u d i e s  have 
g e n e r a l l y  n o t  been ana lyzed  i n  aggrega ted  d a t a .  Such measures 
i n c l u d e  work o r  s c h o o l - l o s s  days ,  s e l f - e v a l u a t e d  measures of  
h e a l t h ,  and numbers and t y p e s  of  c h r o n i c  c o n d i t i o n s .  
There is  some c i r c u m s t a n t i a l  ev idence  t o  sugges t  t h a t  
such morb id i ty  measures,  o r  even more r e f i n e d  d i s e a s e - s p e c i f i c  
ones ,  may va ry  a c r o s s  popu la t i ons .  Roos ,e t  a l .  (1977)  found 
t h a t  a  good d e a l  o f  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t o n s i l l e c t o m y  r a t e s  w i t h i n  
Manitoba cou ld  be  exp l a ined  by v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  i nc idence  of  
upper r e s p i r a t o r y  i n f e c t i o n s  among c h i l d r e n .  Newhouse showed 
t h a t ,  compared t o  u s i n g  h e a l t h  and p r i c e  measures,  a  p lann ing  
method based on sociodemographic p r o x i e s  gave an i n f e r i o r  ex- 
p l a n a t i o n .  So d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no p e r f e c t  mea- 
s u r e  of  t h e  s t a t e  o f  h e a l t h ,  it would seem t o  be d e s i r a b l e  t o  
develop one, even one based on a sample r a t h e r  t h a n  d a t a  from 
an e n t i r e  popu la t i on .  
One of t h e  s t r o n g e s t  f i n d i n g s  of  r e s e a r c h  i n  h e a l t h  econo- 
m i c s  i s  t h a t  money-user p r i c e  does  a f f e c t  use .  However, t h e  
evidence on i t s  magnitude o r  on t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h a t  magnitude 
by type  of d i s e a s e  i s  n o t  conc lu s ive .  The m u l t i m i l l i o n  d o l l a r  
Hea l th  In su rance  Experiment be ing  conducted by t h e  RAND Corpora t ion  
i n  t h e  U.S. i s  i n t ended  t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  magnitude of  t h i s  response ,  
a s  i s  t h e  Hea l th  Insurance  Survey developed by Wilensky and co- 
workers.  
There is also strong evidence on the importance of time 
or travel costs to use of ambulatory care, and even some evi- 
dence that such variables matter for inpatient care.Variations 
in the quality of medical care have theoretically indeterminate 
effects on demand;there is,however,almostno confirmation of this. 
The importance of close substitutes or complements has 
often been recognized, but it has been difficult to get con- 
firmation of a prioi hypotheses: for example, it has been 
hypothesized that reducing the user price of outpatient care 
(including routine physician office visits) by broadening in- 
surance coverage for such care would cause a reduction in 
the use of inpatient care. In almost every empirical example, 
however, it has been found that inpatient demand increased 
when coverage was extended to outpatient care, suggesting 
gross complementarity. (This is not to deny that there may be 
some specific kinds of outpatient services which are substitutes; 
it is only to suggest that the entire class of such services is 
likely to be complementary to inpatient services.) 
The role of information from physicians has already been 
discussed. The role of information from other sources is usually 
handled by various proxies. Recent studies (Pauly, 1980b; Pauly 
and Satterhwaite, 1980) have provided empirical evidence that 
information is important in explaining the use of medical care. 
Income is probably more relevant when the user price is not zero 
(though it is normally correlated with time cost). The main 
point here is that some measure of permanent income, rather 
than income temporarily depressed by illness, should ideally 
be used. 
Sociodemographic variables appear to be related to use and 
to health. For example, the mother's education has effects on 
health, but a less well-defined effect on use of medical care. 
Marital status and family size also affects the demand for care, 
though not in a way which is consistent across studies. What 
is obviously needed is a model of household behavior with re- 
gard to both health and medical carerand this has yet to be 
fully developed. However, the work of Grossman and associates 
comes closest to providing such a theory and tests of it. 
"Taste" is in some sense just a label for our ignorance. 
There is, however, enough evidence for systematic variation in 
demand with variables that cannot themselves be causal, and 
enough unexplained variation, to give one pause. For example, 
length of hospital stay in the U.S. is lower in the West than 
elsewhere when all other variables have been controlled for, 
and this phenomenon has so far resisted explanation. 
These sets of variables affect individual demands and, by 
aggregation,the total demand in the medical care market. The 
demand perceived to be facing any individual provider is obviously 
related to this total demand, but is also influenced by a vari- 
able which might be called the "degree of competition". All of 
my discussion to this point, and all of the HCS modeling at IIASA, 
has proceeded on the assumption that the relevant demand is the 
total demand for the area. This is probably proper for a fully 
centrally controlled system. But where individual providers 
have the ability to choose price, quality,or quantity for them- 
selves, then the relevant demand curve is the firm level demand 
curve, not the aggregate demand curve. 
For example aggregate demand for hospital admissions may 
be little affected by the level of amenities, but the choice 
of which hospital to use may be greatly affected. This means 
that the individual hospital may have very little scope for 
exercising its preferences as to amenities vs. clinical quality 
vs. volume of admissions. 
The degree of competition among providers and its inter- 
action with their motivation is too complex to be discussed in 
this paper; it is the subject of another forthcoming paper. 
Theprincipal point to be made here, however, is that such 
considerations may be of considerable importance in decentra- 
lized systems. 
9. CONCLUSION 
TO what extent could the suggestions in this paper be and 
in actual empirical studies involving DRAM? It would seem 
that there is relatively little difficulty in adding demand to 
the model in some way, although getting the specification ex- 
actly right, and determining whether relationships are identi- 
fied, is a formidable task. In a similar way, adding the pos- 
sibility of demand creation seems relatively straightforward. 
While it is not very difficult to put together a workable 
analytical-forecasting model, and while it may be possible to 
even use a regression approach that is simpler than DRAM, 
accurate and useful forecasts depend on more than just the 
method or the model. They also depend on the type of data 
available and the quality of estimates obtainable from that 
data. There has been almost no concern in the various appli- 
cations of DRAM with the accuracy of parameter estimates. 
While this was perhaps defensible when the only object was 
to illustrate the method, the continued use in the most re- 
cent papers of very small data sets [e.g., 10 observations 
to estimate 4 parameters in each of 3 output categories 
(Aspden, 1980) 1 cannot be likely to lead to very accurate 
forecasts. The danger is that the policymaker may reject 
the idea of the model because of the inaccuracy of the para- 
meter estimates developed. It would be interesting to com- 
pare DRAM as a forecasting model with a different kind of 
model (e.g., to the ad hoc regression model described in the 
footnote insection3 or to a simple trend projection), when both 
are fitted to the same set of data. 
One possible and appropriate application of a DIDD-type 
approach would be to hospital-use data from Canada. Here the 
user price is zero, but the likelihood of mixtures of excess 
demand and equilibrium seems especially high. Moreover, there 
are sufficient numbers of geographically separated market areas 
to permit adequate statistical analysis. Another possibility 
would be to use information from some states in the United States 
where insurance coverage is virtually complete, where there 
have been state efforts to restrict hospital expenditures, and 
where information on hospital case-mix is available. New York, 
Michigan, Maryland, New Jersey, and some other eastern states 
could probably provide an adequate data base, although the 
availability of uniform information on admission by diagnosis 
in all such states would have to be investigated. In any 
event, such information is available for persons over 65. 
Another interesting use would be to compare the coefficients 
for the same model estimated across countries. Do the demand 
parameters differ, or are they similar? What about the HCS 
utility function implied in the behavior under supply con- 
strained regimes? And even what about identifiable corre- 
lates of the propensity of the political system to create 
shortages? 
Adding considerations of production efficiency to DRAM 
in a very general way will probably be more difficult. The 
influences of various incentives on productivity are not well 
known, and the form they will take will vary with the insti- 
tutional arrangements in various countries. The observable 
characteristics of providers which are related to productivity 
are not well known, and there may be considerable unexplainable 
variation in productivity across countries. Where a specific 
influence (e.g., the form of physician compensation in one 
country) is under discussion, it may be possible to develop 
a model to investigate it. In general, however, the degree 
of competition in markets is also not known and not easy to 
measure, nor is it simple to model the wide variety of forms 
that can be taken by compensation schemes and hospital-GP- 
consultant relationships. 
All of these observations suggest that modification of DRAM 
will be a complicated and time-consuming task. Moreover, at 
the end one will only be able to tell the high-level decision- 
maker what his actions will do, not what they ought to do. 
Nevertheless, the process of crawling before walking seems 
to be an essential feature of most systems which turn out 
ultimately to be useful, and this intellectual syste may be 
no exception. 
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